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The Challenge of Harmless Error
Stuart P. Green*

One of the ways we can understand the debate over the proper uses of the
harmless error doctrine is in terms of the traditional distinction in moral
non-consequentialism.
and
consequentialism
between
philosophy
Consequentialism (or teleology, as it was once known) holds that the rightness
or wrongness of actions should be determined by a comparative assessment of
their consequences. Non-consequentialism (or deontology, as it is also known)
asserts that there are certain kinds of acts that are wrong in themselves, and thus
provide a morally unacceptable means to the pursuit of any ends, including ends
that may otherwise be morally attractive.'
A consequentialist looking at the question of harmless error would say that
appellate courts should decide whether to reverse a conviction by considering the
effect of the claimed procedural error. If the error can be shown to have affected
the outcome of the trial, then reversal would be appropriate. But if the verdict
would have been the same regardless of whether the error had ever been
committed, there is no reason to reverse, since the error was, in effect, morally
irrelevant. Indeed, the consequentialist would say that reversing an error that,
by hypothesis, had no effect on the outcome of the trial would lead to
affirmatively bad consequences-including a wasteful and redundant second trial
that would likely end the same way as the first.
A non-consequentialist would view the issue quite differently. The nonconsequentialist would say that when a trial error results in the violation of a
defendant's procedural rights, then those rights should be (in Ronald Dworkin's
famous phrase) taken seriously, regardless of whether the violation actually
affected the trial's outcome. Indeed, as Dworkin has argued, for a right against
the government to be meaningful, considerations of general social utility alone
2
must be inadequate to authorize the state to override it. And, the nonconsequentialist would say, one of the clearest and most straightforward ways of
taking such rights seriously would be to reverse the conviction and require the
defendant to be tried again, this time with his rights restored.
So how is one to decide between these two approaches? The traditional
argument against consequentialism is that it allows (indeed, requires) agents to
do horrific acts (such as rape and torture) so long as they will produce the best
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judge actions according to their ability to promote utility, happiness, or pleasure.
2. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Taking Rights Seriously 191 (1977).
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overall consequences. 3 Yet such reductio ad absurdum arguments seem not to
apply in the context of harmless procedural error, where the evidence against the
defendant is considered so strong that, absent the procedural error, the defendant
would nevertheless have been convicted.
On the other hand, the idea that serious violations of a defendant's

rights-procedural "errors" as we euphemistically call them-should go
unremedied simply because the appellate court believes (with the benefit of
counterfactual hindsight) that they had no impact on the outcome of the trial is

a troubling one. The fact that the defendant's rights were violated, one might
think, should be harm enough to justify reversal.
By itself, the choice between consequentialism and non-consequentialism,
though perhaps instructive, seems unlikely to resolve the practical complexities
of the harmless error doctrine. In what follows, I would like to mention three
additional considerations that ought to play a role in the development of any
comprehensive theory of harmless error.
My first point is that we need to consider the role of appellate courts in a
common law system. The most obvious function of appellate courts is to
identify errors and, where appropriate, to make corrections. In this manner,
appellate courts are concerned with the impact of their decisions on the litigants
in the particular case sub judice. But common law adjudication also reflects a
second vital function. In the common law system, appellate courts formulate law
that will apply in future cases. As one scholar has put it, they "enrich the supply
of legal rules." 4
When an appellate court holds that a lower court has erred, it has a
significant opportunity (even an obligation) to identify, articulate, and analyze the
nature of that error. Through the publication of appellate decisions, trial courts
are put on notice that such conduct constitutes error and other appellate courts
have precedent to guide them in future decisions. The fact that a trial court's
error was harmless on the facts of a particular case need not affect the
precedential value of the court's determination that there was in fact error.
Applying the law developed in such a decision to a subsequent case in which a
similar error has occurred, a court could well determine that the subsequent error
was not harmless.
It might even be argued that the harmless error doctrine has the potential to
promote judicial candor and integrity. In a society that perceives itself as
besieged by crime, appellate courts are under terrific pressure to uphold criminal
convictions. Many judges apparently fear that reversing a conviction on the basis

3. See. e.g., Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in Mortal Questions 53-74 (1979).

An

analogous argument that one often sees in the context of substantive criminal law is that strict
adherence to consequentialism would lead to the perverse conclusion that, so long as sufficient
deterrence would be achieved, we should impose severe punishments for minor offenses and require
that those who are known to be innocent be convicted.
4. Melvin A.Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4 (1989).
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of a "technicality" will create the impression that they are "soft on crime."'
This is particularly so in states, like Louisiana, with popularly elected judges and
a politically conservative electorate. To require a judge to reverse in every case
in which she finds error might well create a perverse incentive against finding
error in the first place. In theory, the harmless error doctrine should free up
appellate judges to consider the merits of the alleged violation on its own terms,
before considering the ultimate disposition of the case. Even if a judge
ultimately decides to affirm the conviction, she can preserve the integrity of the
common law by writing a decision that fully explains the nature of the violation
that occurred.
Second, while acknowledging the importance of the appellate court's
prospective lawmaking function, we need also to recognize the effect on the
defendant in the case under consideration. In particular, we need to appreciate
the significant difference between decisions rendered by juries (who hear the
witnesses and view the evidence at the time of the trial) and decisions rendered

by appellate judges (who must engage in inherently speculative counterfactual
thinking about what such juries might have done if only various trial
errors had not occurred). By allowing judges to uphold convictions by
jurdrs who were improperly deprived of exculpatory evidence or improperly
instructed on the elements of an offense based on the appellate judges' belief that
such jurors would have reached the same verdict even without such errors
requires judges to put themselves in the place of the jurors, and thereby Zreates
the danger that the constitutionally prescribed role of the jury might be
undermined.
Finally, in order to understand the full significance of.the harmless error
doctrine, we need to keep in mind that different kinds of rights further different
kinds of interests. Some rights-such as the right to obtain exculpatory evidence
from the government, the right against having one's confession coerced, and the
right to have the jury instructed on each element of the offense-are largely
intended to ensure the accuracy of the verdict. Other rights-such as the right
to have unlawfully seized evidence excluded from trial, and the right to have a
grand jury selected in a race neutral fashion-serve other goals, such as
protecting privacy, preserving the dignity of the defendant, promoting equal
protection, and preventing police and prosecutorial abuse. Although their
importance is undisputed, such rights have little or nothing to do with the search
for truth. Indeed, the exercise of such rights often has the tendency to impairthe
6
search for truth.

5. E.g., Mark Hamblett, Federal Judge Gave In to Pressure in Suppressing Cocaine. Lawyer
Claims, Crim.J. Weekly, June 29, 1999, at 120 (reporting on appellate arguments in case in which
District Judge Harold Baer allegedly gave in to political pressure by reversing his own prior decision
to suppress).
6. A similar argument is discussed at length in Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 79, 98-106 (1988), but seems to have had little impact in

the courts.
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With respect to the first category of rights-those that are intended primarily

to promote truth-the machinery ofharmless error analysis is properly employed.
Indeed, to fail to consider the possibility of harmless error would be to
undermine the very goal that these rights are intended to further. But when the
purpose of the rights violated relates to matters other than the accuracy of the
verdict, it makes little sense to apply a doctrine triggered by a finding that the
accuracy of the verdict was not compromised. To forgive the violation of such
rights simply because they had no impact on the accuracy of the verdict would
be a bit like canceling a patient's planned heart surgery simply because his
cancer had gone into remission. We may be relieved to learn that the truthfinding function of the trial was not impaired, but we need still to honor those
rights that further goals other than the promotion of truth.
In sum, the problem of harmless error is not susceptible to any easy, onesize-fits-all resolution. A system without some allowance for harmless error
would be paralyzed by the need to retry every case in which even trivial error
occurred. Yet a system that applied the harmless error doctrine indiscriminately
would offer little but lip service to the notion that procedural rights be taken
seriously. The challenge of harmless error, then, is to develop a doctrine
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the most pressing demands of both the
consequentialist and the non-consequentialist.

